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make it the institutional basis for the formulation of the administration's foreign policy. A network of interdepartmental committees was established under the council's aegis to prepare foreign policy options for the President.

Council members include the President and Vice President and the secretaries of state and defense. Presidents regularly have invited to council meetings other government officials whose presence they deemed appropriate.

In its June 27 report, a presidential commission recommended that the Treasury secretary be added to the council. (*Weekly Report* p. 1444)

Background

Stuart Symington (D Mo.) introduced S 2350 on Sept. 17. It was referred to the Armed Services Committee on Sept. 20. The committee immediately referred the bill to the Defense and Treasury Departments for comment.

In hearings Sept. 26, Symington emphasized the compatibility of the bill with the council's purpose as stated in the 1947 act: "To advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." He said that economic issues were increasingly central to any accurate conception of the nation's security interests, citing the impact of the 1973 oil embargo and overseas grain sales on the domestic economy.

"Inasmuch as a sound economy, with a sound dollar, is vital to national security, should there not be concern that the nation's chief fiscal and monetary officer...has no statutory right to participate in these high-level discussions of national security issues?" he asked.

On Oct. 2 the committee approved S 2350 by a 16-0 vote. The report (S Rept 94-423) was filed Oct. 8, and the Senate passed the bill the following day by voice vote.

House Action

S 2350 then was considered by the House Armed Services Committee. Administration opposition was announced by James T. Lynn, director of the Office of

Management and Budget, in a letter to Committee Chairman Melvin Price (D Ill.) on Dec. 1. Lynn argued that the range of the council's concerns extended beyond the Treasury secretary's area of responsibility. "Most issues that come before the council on a regular basis do not have significant economic and monetary policy implications," he reasoned.

He pointed out that it was President Ford's practice to invite the secretary to meetings at which "issues of substantial interest to the Department of the Treasury are considered." He cited the secretary's chairmanship of the Economic Policy Board and the Council of International Economic Policy as additional guarantees that the economic aspects of international problems would receive due consideration.

Price opened hearings on the bill Dec. 2 with a statement endorsing the measure. The sole witness was Amos Jordan, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, who reiterated the position outlined by Lynn. He argued further that membership would impose heavily on the secretary's time and staff resources and that it would undercut the principle that the council should be kept small. He suggested that if Congress expanded the unit, Presidents would abandon it for informal channels of advice on national security matters.

The committee's deliberations revealed substantial disagreement about the meaning of the much-used term "national security" and about the proper weight to give economic considerations in making national security decisions.

Committee member Bob Carr (D Mich.) said the nation simply could not afford to make decisions on arms control issues unmindful of basic economic constraints: "The kind of defense spending we are asking this committee to indulge in day after day has tragic consequences...in the havoc it reaps on our own economy," he said.

A motion to table and thus kill the bill failed on a 15-15 vote Dec. 2. The motion to report the bill then failed on an identical vote. Committee sources reported that some members were disinclined to rush action on the bill. Finally, on Dec. 9 the committee approved S 2350 by voice vote, and the House passed it without change two days later, completing action.



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156—S Rept 94-584) offered by Clark, Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.). Both would prohibit any assistance for covert operations or training for any Angolan movement unless specifically authorized by Congress; require unclassified reports by the President on any assistance he might desire to provide, including normal government-to-government assistance, and give either chamber 30 days to stop any aid. Humphrey's foreign aid subcommittee had approved the same language by a 7-0 vote Dec. 16.

A non-binding resolution (S Res 333) simply stating Senate sentiment was introduced Dec. 17 by Adlai E. Stevenson III (D Ill.), with influential co-sponsors such as Humphrey; Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine), chairman of the Budget Committee; Robert C. Byrd (D W.Va.), assistant majority leader; and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.), ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. In language aimed at the Soviet Union and its grain purchases from this country, the resolution called upon the President to use his authority under the Export Administration Act to curtail exports to countries that persisted in intervening in Angola. Besides economic sanctions against countries intervening there, it urged OAU involvement, United Nations action and a suspension of further U.S. assistance.

In the House, the International Relations Committee adopted by voice vote Dec. 18 an amendment to its draft of the military aid bill that would prohibit any assistance to Angolan factions or other interests that might contribute to hostilities there. If the President determined U.S. assistance were necessary, he was to report publicly to Congress, but the exact proposal for action could be classified. Congress by concurrent resolution could block any proposal. Humanitarian assistance would be permitted. The President also was to report within 60 days on his diplomatic efforts to end the fighting. The committee specifically agreed that the amendment could be reconsidered when it continues markup of the draft legislation in January.

A more limiting amendment had been offered by Don Bonker (D Wash.), but the committee accepted changes offered by Dante B. Fascell (D Fla.) and Jonathan B. Bingham (D N.Y.).

Bonker later expressed frustration that the House could not take more binding and immediate action because of the lack of time before the Christmas recess.

On the Senate side, however, supporters of the Clark-Case-Javits amendment and joint resolution said they thought the Foreign Relations Committee's action would send a message to the President expressing congressional concern, and that the amendment to the military aid bill, if enacted, would prevent a lengthy or deepening involvement in Angola.

Pike Committee:

INTELLIGENCE PROBE

Administration witnesses admitted before the House Select Intelligence Committee Dec. 17 that information indicating possible Soviet violations of the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT) had been withheld from regular intelligence channels. The witnesses insisted, however, that government officials with a "need to know" were always aware of these "hold" items and could find out through informal communications if they needed to.

Retired Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, former chief of naval operations, Dec. 2 had accused Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of keeping relevant information from intelligence analysts in order to insulate the arms agreements from criticism. (*Weekly Report* p. 2645)

Ray S. Cline, former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in Dec. 17 testimony generally concurred with Zumwalt's charges. He said that verification of SALT violations was extremely difficult at best and that the "hold" system exacerbated the problem.

Edward W. Proctor, CIA deputy director for intelligence, told the committee that senior Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA officials, including himself, made the decisions on what intelligence data to place on a "hold" status. He listed three reasons for doing this: 1) to allow clarification of the information's significance; 2) to forestall leaks that could jeopardize ongoing negotiations and risk compromising intelligence sources; and 3) to conform to an understanding reached with the Soviet government restricting public statements on any subject under active discussion in the SALT negotiations or in the Standing Consultative Commission set up in 1972 to oversee compliance with the agreement.

"Hold" procedures had been used in the past, Proctor emphasized, citing as examples information relating to U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and to the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962.

William G. Hyland, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs, insisted that as a practical matter the "hold" procedures could not keep any properly interested officials in ignorance of important information for any length of time. Informal communication within Washington's "SALT community" would prevent that, he said.

But Cline said that as a result of the "hold" procedure, key policymakers—including former Secretary of State William P. Rogers—were kept in the dark about Soviet moves for as long as several months. Cline argued for an orderly examination of the various charges through the regular channels at the National Security Council level. He warned that the "hold" procedure might permit officials with a personal and political stake in the success of SALT I to obfuscate evidence of Soviet non-compliance.

In response to a question by committee member Robert W. Kasten Jr. (R Wis.), Hyland said he was not aware of any other areas currently subject to a "hold." He specifically denied that there had been any new restrictions on access to intelligence about Angola in recent months in the State Department's Intelligence and Research office, which Hyland headed until November.

Final Passage:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Overriding administration opposition, the House Dec. 17 cleared for the President legislation (S 2350) adding the secretary of the Treasury as a member of the National Security Council. S 2350 was passed by the Senate Oct. 9 and was reported (H Rept 94-730) without amendment by the House Armed Services Committee Dec. 15.

Presidents have differed widely in their use of the council, established by the National Security Act of 1947. In 1969 President Nixon and his assistant for national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, reorganized the council to